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1. Introduction 
In the years since the terrorists' attacks on 11 September 
2001 (9/11), the United States (U.S.) has engaged in what 
U.S. attorney general Eric Holder recently characterised as 
an 'armed conflict' with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associ-
ated forces. 1 This armed conflict generated a host of thorny 
legal problems, some of which are of first impression. In par-
ticular, the fact that the adversaries the United States has 
confronted in this timeframe are mainly non-state actors has 
been one of the key complicating factors in the application of 
international humanitarian law (IHL) or, as I prefer, the inter-
national law of armed conflict (ILOAC). 
Do we need new rules to address questions like the status of 
non-state actors in 21st century conflicts? Although as dis-
cussed below, the administration of President Barack Obama 
has called for U.S. ratification of some existing ILOAC and 
ILOAC-related agreements, there have been no formal re-
quests by the U.S. government for additional ILOAC agree-
ments. Can we then assume that the U.S. has found ILOAC 
as it exists today adequate? Or are there other reasons which 
diminish America's appetite for developing new ILOAC 
agreements? 
Although as a retired American officer I cannot speak for the 
U.S. government, the purpose of this short presentation is to 
provide my personal views as to (1) whether certain possible 
proposals for ILOAC additions genuinely serve U.S. inter-
ests, and (2), even if so, whether it is probable that they - or 
any - proposed changes could gamer the necessary U.S. do-
mestic public and political support. This essay will attempt 
to provide context for considering - and anticipating -
American approaches to these questions. 
In general, this paper will conclude that the answer to both 
queries is no. This essay takes the position that existing law 
adequately serves U.S. interests, even if American interpreta-
tions of ILOAC do not always find consensus in the interna-
tional community. This is not to suggest that, objectively, 
there are not areas worthy of further clarification or even re-
vision; rather, I am simply assessing the likelihood of any 
such changes being so demonstrably in the U.S.'s interest as 
to raise reasonable expectations that an accord acceptable to 
the U.S. political process could be reached in the foreseeable 
future. Although formal agreements may not be forthcoming, 
the paper will offer suggestions for approaches that may be 
useful for America and like-minded nations to consider fur-
thering the cause of ameliorating the risk to civilians in war. 
2. Context 
There is little doubt that ILOAC has become increasingly 
important in the 21st century, and has significantly affected-
indeed, many would say, complicated - the conduct of mili-
tary operations. 2 As former North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
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tion (NATO) commander General James Jones observed, 
warfare has now become "very legalistic and very complex", 
requiring "a lawyer or a dozen." 3 Exactly why this phenom-
enon has emerged is worthy of a separate article, but suffice 
to say it parallels a rise in the importance of international law 
generally. 
I believe that the growth of globalised commerce has neces-
sitated a growth of international law and international fo-
rums in order to create and maintain investor confidence in 
international trade. 4 This has raised the world's conscious-
ness, so to speak, of international law. As has always been 
the case, what happens in the commercial arena inevitably 
spills over into the domain of war. History has shown us, for 
example, how civilian-sector industrialisation operated to 
transform first commerce and, eventually, the conduct of 
war. Now law - much influenced by the impact of the civil-
ian-sector information revolution - is changing the conduct 
of war, even if the nature of warfare remains immutable. 
Furthermore, as I have written elsewhere,5 law has become, 
for want of a better term, 'weaponised', in that some bel-
ligerents are attempting to use it as a kind of asymmetric 
war-fighting capability. In this situation, law becomes a sub-
stitute for orthodox military means to achieve effects which, 
strategically speaking, can be indistinguishable from those 
sought from more traditional military methodologies, a phe-
nomenon I call 'lawfare'. 
Though lawfare can take many forms, U.S. adversaries often 
seek to exploit allegations of illegality to gain victories that 
they fail to win on conventional battlefields - if not in real 
courts, then in the so-called courts of public opinion. Con-
sider what Professors Michael Riesman and Chris T. Anto-
niou point out in their 1994 book, The Laws of War: "In 
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modem popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict 
requires a substantial base of public support. That support 
can erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy 
the political objective, if people believe that the war is being 
conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way."6 
Thus, in an era of instant communications especially, inci-
dents of illegalities such as the detainee abuse scandal at Abu 
Ghraib can have a disastrous effect on military operations, 
and one that can persist. General David Petraeus has said, 
"Abu Ghraib and other situations like that are non-
biodegradable. They don't go away. The enemy continues to 
beat you with them like a stick." 7 So adherence to the law, 
and especially ILOAC is essential, not just for its own sake, 
but for purely pragmatic, military reasons. 
As a result, American military commanders are increasingly 
cognisant of the decisive importance of law,8 and how vital it 
is for operations to be conducted in adherence to it in fact 
and - equally important - in appearance. This is why the re-
cent allegations of troop misconduct in Afghanistan are dis-
concerting to them: not only because they represent breaches 
in discipline, but also because they are well aware that such 
actions can further complicate the accomplishment of their 
mission. 
This consciousness of the importance and value of interna-
tional law is not limited to U.S. military commanders, but 
also extends to the larger American polity. Contrary to what 
seems to be a rather widespread myth, Americans do not 
eschew international law generally. In fact, the U.S. has sup-
ported a considerable body of public and private international 
law.9 Admittedly, this official support has a significant mea-
sure of self-interest. As Harold Koh, the legal advisor to the 
U.S. State Department, has said, "obeying international law 
promotes U.S. foreign policy interests and strengthens our in-
ternational leadership." 10 Thus, he adds, the "United States' 
active participation in international tribunals and other inter-
national bodies formed an important part of our practice."" 
Nowhere, however, does he call for additional ILOAC rules. 
What Koh does say is that: "In the area of the law of armed 
conflict, the United States continue[s] to place priority on en-
suring that its detention operations, detainee prosecutions, 
and operations involving the use of force - including those in 
the armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated 
forces - are consistent with all applicable law, including 
international law." 12 
Thus, he puts the U.S. squarely behind the proposition that 
U.S. military operations must (and do) comport with 
ILOAC. Notably, U.S. support ofILOAC is not limited to of-
ficial pronouncements by government officials like Koh. A 
very recent analysis of polling data shows that the American 
body politic supports many international treaties that impact 
ILOAC, to include those that "impose constraints on the use 
of force and coercion." 13 Indeed, polls even show that a 
"large majority also favors having an international body, 
such as a court, to judge compliance with treaties to which 
the United States is party." 14 
3. Americans and ILOAC-Related Agreements 
Broad public support for ILOAC principles generally does 
not, however, necessarily translate into support for specific 
ILOAC-related agreements that may seem to compromise 
American interests. A classic example is the Rome Statute 
which established the International Criminal Court (ICC).15 
Although an early supporter of the ICC, the U.S. objected to 
the final version of the statute. 
Not only did the U.S. Congress refuse to ratify it, it also 
passed legislation in 2002 entitled the American Service-
members Protection Act. 16 Among other things, this Act took 
the unprecedented step of enshrining in law authority for the 
President "to use all means necessary and appropriate to 
bring about the release of any [U.S.] person [ ... ] being 
detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of 
the International Criminal Court." 17 In support of this legis-
lation, the Congress made on-the-record findings that the 
Rome Statute: "[P]urports to establish an arrangement 
whereby United States armed forces operating overseas 
could be conceivably prosecuted by the international court 
even if the United States has not agreed to be bound by the 
treaty. Not only is this contrary to the most fundamental prin-
ciples of treaty law, it could inhibit the ability of the United 
States to use its military to meet alliance obligations and par-
ticipate in multinational operations, including humanitarian 
interventions to save civilian lives. Other contributors to 
peacekeeping operations will be similarly exposed." 18 
The Congress had other concerns as well. It found that if 
U.S. troops were tried by the ICC, they would be "denied 
procedural protections to which all Americans are entitled 
under the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution, 
such as the right to trial by jury." 19 In an era in which the 
U.S. relies upon an all-voluntary military to serve in com-
plex circumstances in any and every comer of the globe, it 
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may be even more important to assure those who do serve 
that they will not be abandoned to a foreign forum which 
does not adhere to basic standards of U.S. constitutional law. 
Currently, however, U.S. objections to the ICC focus primar-
ily on concerns about the definition of the crime of aggres-
sion. At the international review conference in Kampala, 
Uganda, in 2010, the parties decided to delay implementa-
tion of the crime of aggression until 2017, an action sup-
ported by the U.S. It appears that serious U.S. consideration 
of the treaty will have to wait until then. Still, according to 
the U.S. State Department's Harold Koh, "Even as a non-
State party, the United States believes that it can be a valu-
able partner and ally in the cause of advancing international 
justice." 20 
Interestingly, advocacy by the U.S. Department of Defense is 
no panacea. For example, the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 21 has languished in the legis-
lature despite explicit and long-standing military support 
for it.22 Objections have varied over the years, but recently 
opponents have argued that with "China emerging as a major 
power, ratifying the treaty now would encourage Sino-
American strife, constrain U.S. naval activities, and do noth-
ing to resolve China's expansive maritime territorial 
claims." 23 In short, political opposition to UNCLOS seems 
to remain strong. 
All of this should illustrate how difficult it can be to obtain 
the necessary consensus in the United States when an inter-
national treaty has security implications. This is not to say 
such agreements are impossible to achieve: the recent re-
newal of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)24 de-
spite controversy 25 is an important example, as is the ratifica-
tion - in 2008 - of the 1954 Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. 26 Rather, it 
is to acknowledge that they almost always have the potential 
to breed controversy in the U.S., and frequently can be re-
solved only after very lengthy negotiations, if ever. 
Of the several treaties pending before the U.S. Senate for 
ratification, 27 the one with direct ILOAC relevance is Proto-
col II to the Geneva Conventions. 28 Ironically, when this 
protocol (which addresses certain non-international armed 
conflicts) was originally considered in the 1980s by Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan's administration, it was criticised as 
insufficiently expansive. 29 Now, however, the Obama Ad-
ministration enthusiastically backs its ratification. 30 Before 
discussing potential issues with ratification, a little back-
ground about American attitudes towards the Geneva Con-
ventions may be appropriate. 
According to William Leitzau, the U.S. Department of De-
fense's Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee 
Policy, the U.S. is "committed to the Geneva Conventions 
and to educating our citizens of its provisions and protec-
tions ."31 Leitzau adds that "[w]e are at a time in history when 
the importance of International Humanitarian Law in gen-
eral, and the Geneva Conventions in particular, cannot be 
overstated." 32 Still, despite such official pronouncements, it 
is nevertheless true that many Americans are not as familiar 
with the Geneva Conventions as they may think they are, and 
many hold views that may be inconsistent with them. 
In February of 2011, for example, the American Red Cross 
conducted two polls, one of adults aged 18 and older, and an-
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other of youth from 12-17 years old. Asked whether they 
were familiar with the Geneva Conventions, 55% of adults 
believed they were, but only 19% of youth shared the same 
belief about themselves. Additionally, according to the 
American Red Cross, the survey found that: 1. A majority of 
youth (59%) - compared to 51 % of adults - believe there are 
times when it is acceptable to torture the enemy. 2. More 
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than half of youth (56%) believe that there are times when 
it is acceptable to kill enemy prisoners in retaliation if the 
enemy has been killing American prisoners, while only 29% 
of adults agree. 33 3. 41 % of youth believe there are times 
when it is acceptable for the enemy to torture captured Amer-
ican prisoners, while only 30% of adults agree. 
Obviously, even those adult Americans who do claim famil-
iarity with the Geneva Conventions nevertheless approve, at 
least at certain times, of activities that breach them (for 
instance with respect to torturing the enemy "to get impor-
tant military information") .34 Additionally, 51 % of the adults 
in that poll found it was always or sometimes acceptable to 
refuse visits to prisoners "by representative of a neutral orga-
nization to ensure [the prisoners] are being treated well," 35 
something that may also be inconsistent with Geneva Con-
vention requirements. 
Arguably, these contentious views might represent not so 
much any sort of generalised rejection of the Geneva Con-
ventions, but more of a reflection of the trust, confidence, 
and deference accorded members of the armed forces and a 
reluctance to micro-manage what they may need to do in par-
ticular instances during wartime. Notwithstanding the occa-
sional scandal or other well-publicised misdeed, Americans, 
it seems, believe their military will 'do the right thing' in dif-
ficult situations. 
Bear in mind that in the U.S., the armed forces occupy a 
special, almost revered place in the American psyche. For 
the past several years polls show that the military is, for 
example, considered the most trusted institution in American 
society. 36 Moreover, a 2010 poll showed military leaders in 
specific as being tops in public confidence. 37 Likewise, ac-
cording to another poll, Americans consider military officers 
second only to nurses as the profession having the highest 
honesty and ethics.38 
To be sure, the popularity of the armed forces does not make 
them above criticism, but it does tend to cause civilians to be 
deferential to military judgments about operational matters. 
In fact, in the U.S. even the courts seldom second-guess mil-
itary leaders. The Supreme Court, for example, has held that 
"it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity 
in which the courts have less competence" than in the "com-
plex, subtle, and professional decisions" military officers 
must make. 39 Even civilian juries, when confronted with 
allegations of military misconduct in combat, can feel inade-
quate to the task if they are required to question the judgment 
of what those in uniform did in combat. 
The case of former Marine sergeant Jose Luis Nazario offers 
an illustration. In explaining his acquittal in a 2008 trial in 
civilian court of charges related to the killing of four civilians 
in Iraq, "several jurors acknowledged that they also did not 
feel qualified to judge a Marine's actions in the midst of a bat-
tle."40 One said "she hoped the verdict would send a message 
to the troops in Iraq." 41 Reportedly, she wanted the troops to 
"realize that they shouldn't be second-guessed, that we sup-
port them and know that they're doing the right thing." 42 
Given the pragmatism and deference in American thinking 
about the conduct of military operations, let us return to the 
Obama administration's proposal to ratify the Protocol II of 
the Geneva Conventions. The administration says that an 
"extensive interagency review concluded that United States 
military practice is already consistent with the Protocol's 
provisions." 43 This rationale may, however, legitimately 
raise questions about the utility of ratification. 
For example, if the U.S. is already adhering to the underlying 
rationale, what would be the purpose of making such adher-
ence binding up on military commanders and others? Would 
it not be wiser, given the unknowability of the circumstances 
of future battlefields, to forgo an agreement that would limit 
or eliminate discretion? It seems that the administration's 
answer is that it believes that ratification would "not only 
assist us in continuing to exercise leadership in the inter-
national community in developing the law of armed conflict, 
but would also allow us to reaffirm our commitment to 
humane treatment in, and compliance with legal standards 
for, the conduct of armed conflict." 44 
It is difficult, however, to find convincing, objective evi-
dence that U.S. ratification of Protocol II or, for that matter, 
any other ILOAC agreement would matter much in terms of 
foreign public's perceptions of America. And it is likewise 
hard to find much evidence that Americans are much con-
cerned about foreign perceptions of themselves. Of course, it 
can only inure to the U.S.'s benefit that, for example, the 
Pew Research Center reported in July 2011 that "in most 
regions of the world, opinion of the United States continues 
to be more favorable than it was in the Bush years." 45 
Nonetheless, it may very well be that most Americans think 
much as former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates does. In 
the aftermath of the Wikileaks disclosure of a huge amount 
of U.S. classified material, Gates dismissed the fears of 
many pundits who thought the leaks would irreparably harm 
U.S. foreign relations. Gates' comments went well beyond 
the immediate issue of the Wikileaks case when he said: 
"The fact is governments deal with the United States because 
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it's in their interest, not because they like us, not because 
they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep 
secrets. Many governments - some governments - deal with 
us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most 
because they need us. We are still essentially, as has been 
said before, the indispensable nation." 46 
Such thinking is not without critics. As one commentator 
rather nastily put it, many U.S. politicians and others "be-
lieve that principles of international relations somehow do 
not apply to the United States and that America is so differ-
ent from other nations that it doesn't have to pay attention to 
what other people think." 47 While this view may be rightly 
criticised - and probably is an overstatement - it neverthe-
less rings true enough to be worthy of consideration in as-
sessing the degree to which foreign pressure might induce 
the U.S. to enter into ILOAC agreements not manifestly in 
its interests. 
The fact is that Americans are willing to go their own way, so 
to speak, when security is involved - and this has not 
changed despite costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, 
Americans remain prepared to use force when necessary, de-
spite the fact that in December of 2011 66% said that they 
oppose the war in Iraq48 and in March of 2012 it was re-
ported that 60% of Americans believe the war in Afghanistan 
was not "worth it."49 President Obama may have quite accu-
rately captured the attitude of many Americans when he 
declared in 2011 that: "It's true that America cannot use our 
military wherever repression occurs. And given the costs and 
risks of intervention, we must always measure our interests 
against the need for action. But that cannot be an argument 
for never acting on behalf of what's right." 50 
Americans do understand that their view is not always 
shared by others. For instance, they overwhelmingly approve 
of certain counterterrorism activities that are quite controver-
sial in many other parts of the world. Specifically, a poll con-
ducted in early February of 2012 found that "the sharpest 
edges of President Obama's counterterrorism policy, includ-
ing the use of drone aircraft to kill suspected terrorists abroad 
and keeping open the military prison at Guantanamo Bay, 
have broad public support [ ... ]".51 In another poll, in March 
2012, a majority of Americans were found to support "taking 
military action against Iran if there is evidence that Iran is 
building nuclear weapons even if it causes gasoline and fuel 
prices in the United States to go up." 52 
Such support for military action is not, however, undifferen-
tiated. For example, a 2010 poll found that 79% of Ameri-
cans believe that the "U.S. is playing the role of world 
policeman more than it should be." 53 Accordingly, it should 
not be surprising that as of March of 2012, more than two-
thirds of Americans did not think the U.S. has a responsibil-
ity to act regarding the ongoing fighting in Syria,54 although 
two-thirds also "approve of the idea of the Arab League and 
Turkey establishing safe havens inside Syria." 55 
Americans' inclination to think in terms of their own security 
interests does not mean that they reject collaborative efforts 
with other nations. For example, a 2011 poll found that eight 
out of ten Americans thought "it is important that the United 
States maintain an active role within the United Nations" 
even though a majority (51 %) thought the United Nations 
(UN) was an "only somewhat effective" organisation. 56 
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4. ILOAC Controversies 
It is certainly true that there are controversies and uncertain-
ties in the ILOAC realm that would benefit from clarifica-
tion. Yet it is hard to see where, realistically, there is much 
prospect for agreements that would not restrict or even com-
promise what many Americans steadfastly view as essential 
to U.S. security. In this regard, it may be helpful to review 
the U.S. position with regards to Additional Protocol I of the 
Geneva Convention, a key ILOAC agreement to which the 
U.S. is not yet a party.57 
Although the Obama administration has not detailed its 
views, it has reconfirmed that it "continues to have signifi-
cant concerns" with the Protocol.5 8 In 1988, Abraham D. 
Sofaer, then legal advisor to the U.S. Department of State, 
explained the U.S.'s failure to become a party: "The reasons, 
spelled out in a detailed JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] report of 
more than a hundred pages, include the fact that the Protocol 
grants irregulars a legal status which is at times superior to 
that accorded regular forces; that it unreasonably restricts 
attacks against certain objects that have traditionally been 
46 Department of Defense, DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates 
and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon, 30 November 2010, http://www. 
defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4728 (19 December 
2011). 
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Opinion, in: The Atlantic, 7 January 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
international/ arc hi ve/20 12/0 1 / american-po Ii ticians- should-care- more-
about-global-public-opinion/251013/ (18 March 2012). 
48 Iraq, pollingreport.com (reporting a CNN/ORC Poll, 16-18 December 
2011), http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htrn (15 March 2012). 
49 Afghanistan, pollingreport.com (reporting ABC News/Washington 
Post Poll, 7-10 March 2012), http://www.pollingreport.com/afghan.htrn 
(15 March 2012). 
50 B. Obama, Remarks On Libya Delivered at the National Defense Uni-
versity, 28 March 2011, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/obama-
speeches/speech/603/ (19 March 2012). 
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March 2012). 
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legitimate targets; and that it eliminates significant remedies 
in cases where an enemy violates the Protocol." 59 
It is quite possible that U.S. views have not only remained 
unchanged since 1988, but even become more solidified by 
the experience with 'irregulars' in the conflicts since 9/11. In 
particular, the international community has not been espe-
cially successful in compelling compliance with ILOAC by 
such non-state adversaries, and too often has focused its op-
probrium on the U.S. merely because - it sometimes seems -
it takes such criticisms seriously, as is so often not the case 
with America's opponents. 
One of the most serious ILOAC issues is civilian casualties, 
but there is scant indication that additional rules would help 
limit them. In February 2012 the report of the United Nations 
Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) found that in 
2011, the Taliban and other anti-government forces were re-
sponsible for 77% of the civilian deaths. 60 After noting that 
the Taliban claimed to have a policy against targeting civil-
ians, UNAMA concluded that: "UNAMA welcomes any 
public pronouncement of Taliban policy on reducing civilian 
casualties but asserts that such rules are only meaningful if 
implemented on the ground. Despite the Taliban's improved 
messaging on protection of civilians in 2011, UNAMA did 
not document improved compliance with international 
humanitarian law by the Taliban or a reduction in civilian 
casualties caused by them. The Taliban continued to directly 
target civilians and use indiscriminate weapons such as pres-
sure-plate IEDs [improvised explosive devices]." 61 
While it may be helpful to think about new regulations in 
ILOAC, Americans are more disposed to think about enforc-
ing the existing rules in a fair and equitable manner. In fact, 
in the Red Cross poll noted above, 57% of Americans 
endorsed "strengthening the enforcement of laws and rules 
that limit what combatants can do in war."62 In the case of 
the Taliban anyway, it appears that there is yet much work to 
do within the existing framework. 
Moreover, U.S. efforts to neutralise the source of the vast 
majority of civilian deaths have often been criticised on the 
basis of an interpretation of ILOAC with which it does not 
agree. I am talking here about the U.S.'s much-debated use 
of drones. It is beyond the scope of this essay to address that 
debate substantively, but in a series of speeches, U.S. gov-
ernment officials have repeatedly laid out the American posi-
tion on drones, and in each case they asserted that the use of 
drones is clearly in conformance with existing international 
law.63 
That others may have a different opinion does not necessar-
ily render the U.S. interpretation suspect. In discussing, 
whether international law permits a drone strike against a 
threat in a country that is "unwilling or unable" to do any-
thing about it, Harvard law professor Jack Goldsmith admits 
that international law is "not settled" on the point, but insists: 
"[l]t is sufficiently grounded in law and practice that no 
American president charged with keeping the country safe 
could refuse to exercise international self-defense rights 
when presented with a concrete security threat in this situa-
tion that no American president charged with keeping the 
country safe could refuse to exercise international self-
defense rights when presented with a concrete security threat 
in this situation."64 
In any event, what incentive would the U.S. have to seek a 
new ILOAC agreement that might 'settle' the issue in a way 
that could compromise, from an American perspective, the 
responsibilities of the President to keep the country safe? 
Besides, as already mentioned, rank and file Americans 
strongly support the drone campaign. 65 And media reports 
indicate it is effective. According to one article, material re-
portedly obtained from Osama Bin Laden's lair in Pakistan 
showed "frustration with the CIA [Central Intelligence 
Agency] drone campaign" because al-Qaeda operatives were 
"getting killed faster than they could be replaced." 66 More 
recently, another media report said that Bin Laden warned 
followers of "the importance of the exit from Waziristan," 
apparently because of the drone operations, as he importuned 
his followers to "[c]hoose distant locations to which to move 
[ ... ] away from aircraft photography and bombardment." 67 
Thus, the U.S. is unlikely to welcome any proposals that 
might complicate or even compromise the legal basis for us-
ing the capability that, in the U.S. view, has so debilitated the 
principal cause of civilian deaths from terrorism since 9/11. 
Of course, clarification as to the status of non-state actors 
would seem to be useful for the U.S. given the nature of the 
conflicts in which it has been engaged in recent years. How-
ever, in light of the experience with the Interpretive Guid-
ance issued by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) about the status of civilians who directly participate 
in hostilities, there is little to suggest that the U.S. would 
benefit substantively from any international effort. 68 
As Professor Robert Chesney of the University of Texas 
notes, that guidance argues "that members of organized 
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armed groups (OAG) who perform a continuous combat 
function (CCF) in a [non-international armed conflict] are 
not civilians and may be targeted in a manner comparable to 
that of a combatant, not just when engaging in specific acts 
of direct participation." 69 Chesney speculates (but admits he 
does not have confirmation) that the U.S. government may 
interpret "category of targetable fighters in a fashion that is 
broader than the ICRC's CCF test." 70 
What is known is that the Interpretive Guidance has proven 
to be highly controversial. The exact delineations of the con-
troversy are beyond the scope of this essay, but Professor 
Michael Schmitt, a retired U.S. Air Force officer, offers a cri-
tique of the Guidance that resonates with this writer and 
other Americans. 71 He sees international humanitarian law as 
seeking to "infuse the violence of war with humanitarian 
considerations." In doing so, however, he says it "must re-
main sensitive to the interest of states in conducting warfare 
efficiently, for no state likely to find itself on the battlefield 
would accept norms that place its military success, or its sur-
vival, at serious risk." 72 
According to Schmitt, the "very delicate balance between 
two principles: military necessity and humanity undergirds 
virtually all rules of IHL and must be borne in mind in any 
effort to elucidate them." 73 Schmitt then contends that: "It is 
in this regard that the Interpretive Guidance falters. Although 
it represents an important and valuable contribution to un-
derstanding the complex notion of direct participation in 
hostilities, on repeated occasions its interpretations skew the 
balance towards humanity. Unfortunately, such deviations 
from the generally accepted balance will likely cause states, 
which are ultimately responsible for application and enforce-
ment of the law, to view the Interpretive Guidance skepti-
cally."74 
Considering that the U.S. is a nation that "finds itself on the 
battlefield" with relative frequency, it is troubling that the 
ICRC, the non-governmental organisation most influential in 
the development of ILOAC, seems to be unbalancing the 
necessary symbiosis in this critical area. Its interpretations 
could provide U.S. authorities with a strong rationale against 
engaging in any process that might further memorialise 
analyses with the potential, in the U.S. view, to disrupt the 
proper understanding of international law, including ILOAC. 
Other reasons argue against the U.S. becoming interested in 
new ILOAC rules, even where clarification might be helpful. 
For example, one might think cyberwar would be a fertile 
area for new ILOAC regulations. Many countries (not just 
the U.S.) are grappling with the many technical and policy 
issues associated with cyber incidents, not the least of which 
are the thorny legal issues. In particular, the question of what 
constitutes a prohibited use of force under the United Na-
tions Charter,75 or as it is more commonly captioned, 'what 
constitutes an act of war' in the cyber domain, is a frequent 
query. A closely related and recurrent issue is what kind of 
cyber activity would constitute an 'armed attack' within the 
meaning of the self-defense provisions of Article 51 of the 
Charter. 76 
However, the divergence of views about the nature and scope 
of cyberwar militate against any reasonable hope of achiev-
ing an ILOAC-level agreement in the foreseeable future. 
Journalist Tom Gjelten observes that "[d]ifferent ideas of the 
126 
cyber danger around the world illustrate that countries vary 
in the way they perceive their own vulnerabilities." 77 He also 
goes on to warn: "While peace accords and disarmament 
agreements are attractive, however, democracies have reason 
to proceed cautiously in this area, precisely because of dif-
ferences in the way cyber "attacks" are being defined in in-
ternational forums. Russia, which for more than a decade has 
been promoting a global cyber arms control agreement, 
would like to criminalize what Soviet diplomats once called 
"ideological aggression", and China and allied governments, 
especially in the Middle East and Africa, share this view."78 
At least two reasons exist for a lack of optimism about a 
global cyber agreement. First, as Gjelten implies, such an 
agreement could be used by some non-democratic states to 
crush dissent, a result that the U.S. would doubtless dis-
favour. In fact, a senior State Department official said that 
China and Russia "seek to justify the establishment of sover-
eign government control over internet resources and over 
freedom of expression in order to maintain the security of 
their state."79 
Secondly, Gjelten argues that with respect to the U.S. armed 
forces, "no other military has such an advanced offensive 
capability for cyber war." 8° Consequently, he says, under "a 
comprehensive cyber arms limitation agreement, the United 
States would presumably have to accept deep constraints on 
its use of cyber weapons and techniques." 81Plainly, there is 
little incentive for America to accept such constraints, espe-
cially if such restrictions would also operate to suppress free 
speech in non-democratic states. 
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Space is yet another area that would seem ripe for more 
extensive ILOAC treatment. Again, however, the U.S. is 
arguably the premier space-faring nation, so it is not clear 
how a new agreement could avoid putting legal fetters on a 
U.S. capability already extant, and in which it enjoys an 
asymmetric advantage over potential foes. Nevertheless, the 
U.S. does see the value in collaboration, and has recently 
joined with the European Union and other nations to develop 
a voluntary International Code of Conduct for Outer Space 
Activities. 82 This could be an important first step. 
According to the U.S. State Department, the agreement will 
be "focused on the use of voluntary and pragmatic trans-
parency and confidence-building measures to help prevent 
mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust in space." 83 At the 
same time, the Department insists that the administration "is 
committed to ensuring that an International Code enhances 
national security and maintains the United States' inherent 
right of individual and collective self-defense, a fundamental 
part of international law" and adds an important caveat that 
syncs with the long-standing U.S. view: the "United States 
would only subscribe to such a Code of Conduct if it protects 
and enhances the national and economic security of the 
United States, our allies, and our friends." 84 
While not truly an ILOAC agreement, and obviously one 
that lacks the enforceability of the Geneva Conventions, the 
Code does represent the kind of agreement that is achievable 
in an area of growing importance, and one with significant 
security implications. The references to "maintain[ing] the 
United States' inherent right of individual and collective self-
defense," as well as the statement that U.S. subscription to 
the Code is conditioned on its actually "enhancing" U.S. se-
curity (as opposed to merely maintaining or even memorial-
ising the status quo) appears to be instructive as to what 
predicates are necessary for American involvement in pro-
posals for new ILOAC rules. 
5. Concluding Observations 
This essay may paint a discouraging picture for those who 
believe that additional ILOAC rules may ameliorate the im-
pact of war on civilians. It would seem that American sup-
port for such proposals is uncertain at best, and that the U.S. 
is largely satisfied with its interpretations of existing law. 
There does not appear to be a strong counter-narrative that 
would encourage optimism about a change in this status quo. 
New rules may not, however, be the only way to further min-
imise civilian suffering in conflict. The greater availability 
and wider use of precision munitions is an example of a de-
velopment that may operate as effectively to protect civilians 
as new ILOAC rules, and would be something that the U.S. 
could support. Polls show that Americans - 80% in fact -
very strongly support the idea of increasing the "accuracy of 
weapons to reduce unintended casualties." 85 
Unfortunately, this method of achieving the same purpose as 
that desired by many advocates of additional ILOAC rules -
the protection of civilians - may not be acceptable to Amer-
ica's allies, including those in NATO. Precision munitions 
are costly, and procuring them at a time of budgetary auster-
ity can be contentious. Yet inadequate inventories also can be 
costly in terms of human lives if they are not available when 
needed. Recall that during the Libya operation it was re-
ported that military leaders of the six NATO nations that pro-
vided combat aircraft "openly complain[ed] that they are 
running out of smart bombs" because procurement of them 
had been limited by budget cuts.86 
Clearly, NATO countries - which, on average, spend only 
1.7% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense 87 -
do not give defense spending the priority that the U.S. does, 
even though the accuracy of expensive American weaponry 
may protect civilians in wartime at least as much as ILOAC 
does. This seeming uneven sharing of the burden is having 
an effect on the American perspective. In stinging 2010 
speech former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said: "The 
blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and 
patience in the U.S. Congress - and in the American body 
politic writ large - to expend increasingly precious funds on 
behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the 
necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be 
serious and capable partners in their own defense. Nations 
apparently [are] willing and eager for American taxpayers 
to assume the growing security burden left by reductions in 
European defense budgets." 88 
Many might understandably consider these to be hard - and 
to an extent, unfair - words to direct towards friends and 
allies, but they do suggest an important reason why it is 
unlikely that Americans would evince a particular interest 
in new ILOAC regulations. Americans, who spend 4.8% of 
GDP on defense, 89 are not likely to be disposed to embrace in 
the near term any new ILOAC regulations - even emanating 
from friendly countries - absent evidence of an equal will-
ingness, as Secretary Gates says, to devote the necessary 
resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and 
capable partners in their own defense. 
To reiterate, Americans do strongly support international 
law, and especially ILOAC. They take their obligations un-
der applicable law very seriously, and recognise that there 
are areas where clarifications of ILOAC might be helpful. 
That said, they are quite wary of new agreements or rules, 
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Thema 
and especially those that may, in practice, serve more as a re-
straint on U.S. actions than on those who the U.S. opposes 
and who violate existing ILOAC regulations with regularity. 
In 1988 Abraham Sofaer (while still the U.S Department of 
State legal advisor) observed that: "The approval of the 
United States should never ·be taken for granted, especially 
when an agreement deals with national security, the conduct 
of military operations and the protection of victims of war."90 
In this writer's opinion, these words are as relevant in 
analysing the American mindset today as they were when 
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uttered a quarter-century ago. While the U.S. would no doubt 
be open to discussing ILOAC proposals, those who may 
want to propose them would be well-served by cultivating a 
keen appreciation of the American perspective, even if that 
perspective is not fully shared by America's closest friends 
and most treasured allies. 
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